Voting Alone: The Decline of Bodily Mass Communication and Public Sensationalism in Presidential Elections by Marvin, Carolyn & Simonson, Peter
Masthead Logo
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Departmental Papers (ASC) Annenberg School for Communication
6-2004
Voting Alone: The Decline of Bodily Mass
Communication and Public Sensationalism in
Presidential Elections
Carolyn Marvin
University of Pennsylvania, cmarvin@asc.upenn.edu
Peter Simonson
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers
Part of the Communication Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/634
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marvin, C., & Simonson, P. (2004). Voting Alone: The Decline of Bodily Mass Communication and Public Sensationalism in
Presidential Elections. Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, 1 (2), 127-150. https://doi.org/10.1080/
14791420410001685359
Voting Alone: The Decline of Bodily Mass Communication and Public
Sensationalism in Presidential Elections
Abstract
The congregational crowd was a powerful mode of political communication in the nineteenth-century US
until banished by the imposition of literate modes on popular electoral politics by Progressive reformers. We
examine its major channels of expression, bodily mass communication and public sensationalism, within a
framework of class-based struggle, observing that the practice of live bodily assembly created broad points of
entry into political life, socialized the young, and successfully conveyed the importance of voting. A text-based
normative model of the informed deliberative voter, we argue, offers too narrow a conception of participation
compared to a more spaciously conceived democratic community.
Keywords
democracy, civic participation, bodily communication, class struggle, public assembly, voting
Disciplines
Communication | Social and Behavioral Sciences
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/634
 
Voting Alone: The Decline of Bodily Mass Communication and Public 
Sensationalism in Presidential Elections 
Carolyn Marvin & Peter Simonson 
 
The congregational crowd was a powerful mode of political communication in the nineteenth-century US until 
banished by the imposition of literate modes on popular electoral politics by Progressive reformers. We examine its 
major channels of expression, bodily mass communication and public sensationalism, within a framework of class-
based struggle, observing that the practice of live bodily assembly created broad points of entry into political life, 
socialized the young, and successfully conveyed the importance of voting. A text-based normative model of the 
informed deliberative voter, we argue, offers too narrow a conception of participation compared to a more spaciously 
conceived democratic community. 
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 The only weapon we have is our bodies.—Bayard Rustin 
This essay seeks to retrieve a powerful mode of popular communication for a politics from which it is 
now, but has not always been, missing. We will use the term congregational communication to describe 
this instrumentality, which derives from deeply embedded social habits. As far back as the twelfth 
century, to congregate meant to make oneself a companion and accompany others in mingling, singing, 
fighting, or worshiping. Despite more contemporary associations with religious gatherings, 
congregations may amass as easily for rebellion as for worship, for lynching as for inauguration. 
Congregations are not defined by their moral achievements, but by the face-to-face circulation of a large 
number of people aware of their own collectivity. 
 As we mean the term, congregations are a species of crowd. We are interested in political 
crowds, or congregations, in US presidential campaigns during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Though congregational crowds are feared for their capacity to exercise physical force, this 
potential lies at the heart of their political efficacy. The capacity to control major sites of discourse 
physically and symbolically is fundamental to political change.1 Congregational crowds have often 
exercised power during the last two centuries, and still do. In terms of recent events only, Shia in Basra 
gathered by the hundreds of thousands to stake a claim to the religious and political future of Iraq after 
the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Students in Tiananmen Square in 1989 pitted their bodies against a 
regime and mesmerized the world. More than one hundred thousand citizens pressed for civil rights for 
African Americans in the 1963 March on Washington, DC. Protesters disrupted the Democratic National 
Convention in Chicago in 1968. Moscow crowds helped protect the Russian parliament from a coup of 
its new democracy in 1991. 
 Powerful episodic crowds like these constitute one important form of congregational 
communication. Regularly occurring ritual assemblies are another. These once played a key role in US 
presidential elections, along with Independence Day the most important regularly occurring ritual 
occasions of the nation. Because participation in presidential elections is the privilege and right of all 
adult citizens, these recurring elections occupy a special place among US democratic rituals. By the end 
of the nineteenth century, however, congregational crowds in popular elections had become 
threatening to Progressive reformers and their allies. In the decades leading up to World War I, these 
reformers maneuvered to introduce literate modes that supplanted the unique communicative powers 
of electoral crowds, engineered their physical dispersal, and championed a notion of them as irrational 
and undemocratic. 
 Restrictions on popular crowds removed a significant means of forging and expressing what 
Robert Putnam calls “bridging” and “bonding” social capital among white working classes and 
immigrants, part of a more general elite effort to limit their participation in national politics.2 The 
delegitimatization of this popular communicative resource in favor of literacy-based forms weakened 
the challenge that less privileged classes could mount to a political system that had failed them in a 
rapidly industrializing economy. Our title refers to how reformers transformed Election Day into a ritual 
of “voting alone,” a solitary act performed in private by literate electors abstracted from any witnessing 
or celebrating community. It plays on “bowling alone,” Putnam’s phrase for connecting the decline of 
associational sociability to falling rates of public participation in the twentieth century. In time, those for 
whom congregational crowds had been critical for mobilizing local allies and exerting local power 
became the least civically active participants of all. 
 Despite their continuing importance in social life, crowds remain largely unexamined in 
communication studies, 3 perhaps because they are thought to lack an essential capacity for rational 
communication. This belief is a legacy of the period we examine, when reformers feared gatherings in 
public and pursued strategies to remove them from national politics. Though crowds now and then 
appear in the literature as receptive audiences, 4 they rarely appear as agents of coherent messages. 
“Collective gatherings,” by contrast, are often described as message-bearing entities. Émile Durkheim, 
for example, held a famously favorable view of the communicative efficacy of collective gatherings, 
asserting that society “cannot revitalize the awareness it has of itself unless it assembles.”5 
 Crowds are especially suspect to those who point out that solidarity is not the same as rational 
decision-making. Nineteenth-century theories of the regressive psychology of crowds by Continental 
writers such as Le Bon, Sighele, and Tarde articulated elite hostility to forms of power manifest in 
unregulated popular assemblies.6 These theories influenced Progressive reformers in the US who were 
vigilant to the dangers of the “crowd mind.”7 The history of crowds in US election rituals is thus tied to a 
larger struggle for power between popular and elite classes. We believe this struggle can fruitfully be 
mapped within a communicative framework of recurring class-based confrontations between bodily and 
textual styles of communication. The following discussion elaborates that framework and applies it to 
shifts in popular political communication at the end of the nineteenth century. 
 
Elite Texts and Massed Bodies 
Expressive bodily display is the preserve of the people, whose power and participation in society depend 
on the value of their bodies for the cultural muscle-work that society finds useful, especially manual 
labor and war. Textual expression is the preserve of those whose cultural power derives from 
educational and other textualizing credentials.8 In general, the bodies of those with the power to 
produce and use texts exert control over bodies that lack that power. The resulting story is never 
exclusively one of textual triumph, since texts in industrialized societies may elide and suppress the body 
but can never eliminate it. 
 This is not for lack of trying. Late nineteenth-century reformers criticized perambulatory 
outdoor gatherings and preferred the “public” to be seated indoors conversing and reading newspapers. 
In their view, literacy alone guaranteed virtuous civic behavior. It banished the menace of immediate 
action, the weapon of the crowd, by manipulating time and public visibility to frustrate congregational 
communication as an instrument of political participation. Most obviously, literate practice enforced 
temporal delays in exchanges among speakers and audiences. Authors could not be heckled or 
challenged during the writing process, and were long gone at the moment and site of published delivery. 
By this means, elite expression in essays and newspapers was able to remove itself physically from 
immediate popular engagement and criticism. 
 Elites also cultivated individual reputation and fame through civic written commentary. As a 
practical matter, the highest form of literate civic action vouchsafed to ordinary citizens was the secret 
written ballot—by comparison, a strikingly anonymous instrument. Counted ballots registered the 
aggregate democratic verdict, but concealed what had previously been open to inspection; namely, the 
identifiable political loyalties of live voters. These were barred from display at a moment when their 
force and weight would be importantly manifest to like-minded allies or determined opponents. 
Reformers argued that these and other literate constraints on popular participation prevented abuses 
by the crowd. We argue that congregational crowds were engaged in a species of nontextual 
communication worthy of analysis in its own right as a significant and distinctive democratic 
counterweight to elite power. 
 We will attend to two important components of nineteenth-century congregational 
communication that we call bodily mass communication and public sensationalism. Bodily mass 
communication was the immediate, live assembly of large groups in proximate, usually outdoor space 
less vulnerable than indoor spaces to extraneous control. It featured multiple bodies experiencing 
themselves as mutually present to one another. Collective scripted and unscripted expression offered a 
variety of opportunities to observe and embrace public roles in a highly theatrical setting. This was the 
mise-en-scène of public sensationalism, a dense, memorable sensory surround of immediate, publicly 
shared sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and touches. Public sensationalism heightened emotional arousal 
and channeled communicative intent. It marked off special occasions from ordinary events and drew 
those with unpolished cultural tastes and sensibilities into common enactments. Public sensationalism 
provided tools for rearranging public space and claiming it for the popular sphere.  
 We track the decline of congregational communication in nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
rituals of presidential campaigning by reconceptualizing recent accounts of campaign practice in US 
electoral history as skirmishes in a class-based, culturally fraught struggle between bodily and textual 
styles of communication.9 We argue that textualized messages displaced amassed, tangible bodies as 
the prevailing medium of ritual expression in presidential elections. In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, electoral reforms emphasized the decorous, silent, and literate at the expense of 
the spectacular, raucous, and bodily. Live popular spectacle was drastically curtailed. Bodies no longer 
commingled in ways that integrated national politics with citizens’ concrete lives. Collective participation 
was dislodged from the political center and appended to extra-local national campaigns that were deaf 
to the distinctive aesthetic, temporal, sensory, and social rhythms of local communities.  
 We entertain scant nostalgia for nineteenth-century arrangements that barred women, blacks, 
Chinese, Native Americans and other groups from full political participation. These restrictions reflected 
a conservative popular politics structured by corporeal signifiers of race, gender, class, ethnicity, and 
regional style, and enforced through bodily intimidation that aggrandized white male political power. 
Important democratic elements nevertheless informed late nineteenth-century political rituals with 
broadband modes of entry for genteel and vulgar public tastes and multiple affirmations of the 
importance of ordinary people. These elements were removed by twentieth-century elites, particularly 
as they acquired momentum from industrialization and waves of European immigration. Since a good 
deal of democratic theorizing has overemphasized the cerebral ideal of the informed citizen without 
recognizing the somatic levels on which democratic political participation also occurs, these popular 
elements have not been fully appreciated. They are our concern here. For, as the popular body was 
dispersed and silenced at the turn of the twentieth century, elections became less compelling, large 
segments of the population removed themselves from the process, and the horizons of democratic 
possibility receded.  
 We focus on campaign practice from the Civil War to World War I, a period in which middle- and 
upper-class antipathy toward working-class citizens effectively narrowed the popular franchise. The 
struggle we describe between texts and bodies for control of presidential campaigns supports Alexander 
Keyssar’s thesis that class antagonism was the chief obstacle to universal suffrage in the US during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.10 Though Keyssar concedes that race, gender, and ethnicity strongly 
influence class position, he argues that class was the primary lens through which racial, gender, and 
ethnic divisions were understood and acted out. We argue that communicative style was an equally 
potent signifier of class position. In the period we examine, texts fought bodies and won. We begin by 
identifying traditional body-based components of presidential elections. Next, we discuss the unique 
ritual information that bodies communicate. We examine how bodily mass communication and public 
sensationalism conveyed the importance of elections, mounted civic appeals to less refined sensibilities, 
anointed individual participation with visible value, and dramatized popular power. We sketch the 
transformation to less popular, more textualized election rituals by the 1910s. Finally, we show how 
Americans continued to inhabit the disembodied political text during the 2000 presidential election. 
 
Bodily Participation and Popular Electoral Rituals 
The rise and fall of a distinctive popular political culture in the US is partly reflected in voting statistics 
from 1840 to 1920. The last decades of the nineteenth century saw the highest voter turnouts in 
American electoral history. While about half of today’s eligible voters cast ballots, 69 percent of eligible 
citizens voted on average for all presidential elections between 1840 and 1872. For presidential 
elections from 1876 to 1900, that average was 77 percent. Participation in Northern states, separately 
considered, was higher still. From 1876 to 1900, 82 percent of Northerners cast ballots in presidential 
elections. Twelve different states registered turnouts above 90 percent in at least one presidential 
election during this period. These numbers dropped significantly in the first decades of the twentieth 
century. National turnout averaged 65 percent between 1900 and 1920, and 52 percent from 1920 to 
1928. In the North during the same period, turnouts were 75 percent and 58 percent.11  
 Reported levels of electoral participation must be weighed against the fact that large segments 
of the population were prohibited from voting. Women, slaves, Native Americans, and minors remained 
disenfranchised throughout the nineteenth century. Free blacks voted only in a handful of states before 
the Civil War. Despite the enfranchisement of African Americans by the Fifteenth Amendment (1870), 
Jim Crow laws and social intimidation effectively reserved nineteenth-century voting to those who were 
white, male, and twenty-one.12 Little correlation existed between voting levels and socioeconomic 
status in the late nineteenth century. Generally speaking, working classes were as likely to vote as elites. 
This changed as elections became much less successful in drawing in the young and working classes, 
whose levels of participation declined steeply after 1900.13  
 Attention to voting alone also fails to capture how campaigns and elections actually unfolded in 
nineteenth-century American life. Voting was only one facet of popular involvement in election rituals 
and must be considered within the broader sweep of popular power. This included mob violence against 
the abolitionist press and Reconstruction rioting by whites intent on removing federal force from the 
South following the Civil War.14 Of more concern to Northern propertied classes was the exercise of 
physical force by striking workers. Beginning with the Great Railroad Strike of 1877, the first nationwide 
labor action, US workers increasingly used their massed bodies to protest low wages, long hours, and 
unfair work rules. The number of strikes tripled in the mid-1880s, to about 1,500 in 1886, and remained 
high into the 1890s. Between 1875 and 1910, workers clashed with troops nearly 500 times. This period 
also saw some of the most infamous uprisings in US history, among them the Homestead steel workers’ 
strike of 1892 and the Pullman strike of 1894.15 Against this background, popular crowds transformed 
late nineteenth-century presidential contests into charged public events that dramatized the force of 
assembled bodies and challenged an elite textualized order.  
 Presidential elections acquired a characteristic sequence and form in the post-Civil War era. In 
the spring of a presidential year, party activists assembled in ward, county, and state meetings to 
nominate local and state candidates and to select delegates for the national convention later that 
summer. By early summer, this participatory base had broadened to embrace political clubs formed for 
the duration of the election. These clubs organized local ratification ceremonies in which partisans 
shouted out assent and support for nominees to the national conventions.16 Local party cadres raised 
flagpoles that fluttered with partisan emblems and banners. They strove to cut down rivals’ flagpoles in 
a spirited effort to show whose pole was longest.  
 Political clubs organized marching companies to perform elaborate drill maneuvers in partisan 
parades. Often held at night, these drew tens of thousands of marchers with brass bands, glee clubs, 
processions of wagons, and seas of kerosene torchlights. As Election Day neared, “monster rallies” 
attracted thousands more to large feasts and additional nighttime spectacle.17 Election Eve typically saw 
one last torchlight procession as parties mobilized their troops for the next day’s battle. The climax of 
these popular rites was Election Day, an official holiday in many states. This ritual timeout from routine 
time was an all-day affair devoted to food, drink, and socializing.18 In contrast to today’s lengthy and 
diffuse presidential campaigns, mid-nineteenth-century elections unfolded within a narrow interval that 
roughly coincided with the growing season, referencing rhythms of bodily work that had grounded 
centuries of settled collective life.  
 These activities made room for two groups excluded from voting, namely, white women and 
young white men. Beginning in 1840, Whigs encouraged women to attend political rallies (10,000 
reportedly waved handkerchiefs at a Dayton, Ohio rally) at which speakers flattered them, and 
newspaper editors boasted about their presence. Democrats soon organized similar events for women, 
urging them to direct two-step flows of political communication to their voting menfolk.19 Women 
attended and marched in parades, in one case wearing sashes that proclaimed, “Whig Husbands or 
None.”20 They decorated floats, hosted picnics and barbecues, lit their houses as their men passed by in 
torchlight processions, and extinguished the same light when political rivals approached.21 In some 
locales, they organized political clubs. After the Civil War, women presented home-sewn 
commemorative banners to party leaders at local mass meetings to kick off election campaigns.22  
 Boys, the largest disenfranchised group besides women, occupied a prized place of their own in 
electoral rituals. Adolescent white males recruited for marching companies often performed 
synchronized routines in public processions.23 New Jersey tradition called for boys to build Election Eve 
bonfires with confiscated boards, fences, and water barrels.24 Parades attracted young spectators of 
both sexes and socialized them to the larger political culture.25  
 Framing these activities as ritual adds a useful dimension to more conventional accounts of 
political participation. Though political activity may enlist ritual, ritual order is not political order, 
broadly understood as the distribution of power and resources. According to Roy Rappaport, ritual is a 
communicative form peculiarly designed to transmit certain kinds of information. It makes into res, or 
realizes, what cannot be accomplished by other means. Its distinctiveness is indexically tied to bodily 
presence. As Rappaport writes, “by performing a liturgical order the participants accept, and indicate to 
themselves and others that they accept, whatever is encoded by the canon of that order.”26 What is 
ritually encoded is the message that the group exists, and that its members have concrete obligations to 
one another. Acceptance of this order is not manifest primarily as belief, an inward and private state, 
but acted out before observing others who reciprocate by signifying their own public commitments. 
Ritual indexically displays and morally enacts congregational existence by assembling bodies for mutual 
sensory contact and circulation. Their very presence in ritual settings publicly signals their willingness to 
participate in the group.27  
 Outdoor life in nineteenth-century towns was well suited for communities to experience 
themselves ritually. Though social-convivial campaign gatherings fell short of the inclusive equality of 
contemporary democratic ideals, they were unquestionably popular as rituals of unregulated public 
encounter. The looseness of popular crowds stood in marked contrast to European courtly traditions. 
Aristocratic rituals of theater, jousting, dancing, and religion conveyed what Habermas has called 
“representation[s] of publicness”28 by closely regulating the location and movement of participants’ 
bodies in roles reserved to the nobly born and specially elevated. Popular electoral rituals in the US 
presented few restrictions on gestures and permitted the comparatively free circulation of bodies. (By 
contrast, restraints imposed by nineteenth-century US elites on bodily expression among audiences for 
theater, opera, and symphony foreshadowed their domination of other aspects of twentieth-century 
culture, including political campaigns.29) Though access was far from total, social boundaries were also 
significantly more permeable in US election rituals.  
 Congregational communication in the popular sphere was never the rational-critical discussion 
of the Habermasian public sphere. The fertile fostering of body-based links through unregulated 
circulation created local traditions of participation in parades, rallies, flagpole-raising, drinking, feasting, 
voting and speech-making. Participation sometimes enacted celebratory unity, other times murderous 
confrontation. Though popular crowds could be convinced of their own charismatic morality in 
moments of public excitement, virtue was never the definer of the popular. If the bourgeois public 
sphere was constituted in textualized genteel discussion by a restrained and feminized “reading public,” 
the popular sphere was constituted in fluid, unfettered circulation within a domain of public 
sensationalism. Its defining character was the muscle power lodged in amassed bodies boldly laying 
claim to public space. These displays threatened elites, who sometimes deployed domestic armies of 
uniformed soldiers and police, the visible antithesis of the unregulated crowd, to seize public space from 
freely moving masses. 
 
Sensing Public Life: Obvious Aspects of Campaign Ritual 
Bodily mass communication linked participants in festivals, feasting, fighting, rallies, and other public 
gatherings. It was enhanced by public sensationalism, an immediate surround of dense sensory cues 
that heightened collective experience and marked it as out of the ordinary. Public sensationalism 
constitutes the surface element of ritual, what Rappaport calls its “obvious aspects.” Extraordinary, 
shared sensations drew attention to lived time and space by dramatizing and intensifying bodily 
experience to make it memorable. Public places filled with sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and touches 
drew community members to definable spaces. They focused collective attention. Public sensationalism 
signaled to ordinary people that elections were significant, and participation in them mattered.  
 Multiple modes of sensory stimulation courted a broad demographic swath. Popular songs with 
nonsense lyrics, stem-winding democratic oratory delivered to large crowds, nighttime seas of torchlight 
and flame, mass quantities of roasted meats, whiskey, hard cider, and beer appealed to less delicate 
political tastes. Fireworks, caged animals, balloon ascents, costumed adults and glee clubs offered up 
satisfying sensations for entire families. One observer understood the power of public sensationalism 
exactly. “They have discovered in this country the effects of the spectacular and the auricular,” he 
wrote, “and they have applied it on a characteristically vast scale. You can disregard argument; you can 
ignore self-interest; you can forget country; you can even refuse a bribe. But you cannot fail to see and 
hear and to be struck well-nigh resistless by so imperious and masterful appeal to the senses of the 
body.”30  
 Election Day was a noisy affair. Amassed citizens, not mass-mediated commentators, made the 
public sounds. The democratic noises of bands, cannons and loud voices called the popular body to rites 
of civic regeneration. Polling places were beehives of voters boisterously hailing friends and 
acquaintances.31 From her front porch, a Missouri woman heard “hollering, screaming, cursing, and 
swearing that is constantly disturbing the peace.”32 Amidst indecorous sounds of popular celebration, 
partisans gathered to out-sing and out-cheer their opponents. An observer noted “an endless flutter of 
fluttering flags, monstrous devices, a din of fife, trumpet and drum and the endless firing of light and 
heavy artillery.”33 Finding his polling booth surrounded by Whigs bent on preventing their opponents 
from voting, a Democratic voter recalled, “Some halloed one thing and some another. Some imitated 
the Barking of Dogs and some the Roaring of Bulls, all making as much noise as they could.”34  
 Elections featured special tastes. Election-day cakes baked by the women of the community 
were a favorite tradition, but public drink dominated the realm of popular taste. Liquor communicated 
and created festivity. Local candidates and party workers dispensed free alcohol, typically the greatest 
Election Day expense.35 In one city, Democrats brought voters to the polls in wagons stocked with 
whiskey barrels. Citizens also carried their own flasks and stood treat for drinks. A California voter 
reported having as many as 25 drinks in an hour with his friends, during which “many of us got pretty 
essentially tight.”36 To some voters, drinking was the point of elections. A voter arrested in 1856 for 
disturbing the peace sang, “I’m no politician, nor ever shall be/ The job of my life is to go on a spree/ 
Whoever is president is all one to me/ While I can get gloriously corned.”37 Repeated Election Day 
efforts to regulate New Jersey saloons during the 1880s were mostly futile.38  
 Liquor facilitated rituals of public touch—from handshakes and other amicable connecting rites 
to physical intimidation. A Mississippian remarked that men gathered “for the triple purpose of voting, 
spreeing and lastly for the peculiar pleasure of witnessing the beginning-aye, ‘The Opening of the Fall 
Fighting Campaign.’ ”39 The very possibility of violence heightened ritual drama and interest. Partisan 
toughs, “b’hoys” and “shoulder strikers” staged real and sham fights to keep timid opponents from the 
polls.40 Election Day mobs armed with rocks, brickbats, guns and knives caused significant bloodletting 
and accounted for at least 89 deaths between 1828 and 1861.41  
 Contemporary “campaigns” are pale echoes of the pugilistic rehearsals that dominated popular 
elections from the 1850s to 1890s. Agonistic masculine drama representing the force of the popular 
body coursed through nineteenth-century political rhetoric. Electoral sensations frequently suggested 
preparation for war, and parties understood their work as mobilizing every eligible voter. Deploying 
slogans such as “Falter not before the enemy,” each side marshaled troops to battle the opposition. 
Political clubs formed marching orders with “captains” and “lieutenants.” These orders paraded in every 
style of uniform from kepis and oilskin capes to elaborate military dress accessorized with leather spats, 
belt, gloves, and dress headgear. Brandishing torchlights that resembled rifles, political foot soldiers 
executed intricate drills to crisp military commands. Parades mimicked battlefields with gun and cannon 
fire, fireworks, skyrockets, roman candles spewing from “volcano wagons,” and the smell of sulfur and 
smoke. Accompanied by brass bands, martial songs issued from the bellowing voices of marching men 
and officers on horseback.42 On such occasions, young, especially working-class men, were ritual actors 
in barely restrained displays of masculine violence intended to thrill and intimidate spectators in the 
streets. Just as royal processions symbolized and displayed political power backed by force, pageants of 
marching men presented themselves as the democratic sovereign whose formidable strength likewise 
could be mobilized. When violence did erupt from volatile shifts of crowd mood, or exerted itself against 
group obstacles or other persons, it enacted tactile communication that conveyed popular power in the 
most direct terms. When this era ended after World War I, a powerful avenue of body-based political 
expression was effectively closed.  
 Voting provided important shared sensations of its own. Until the 1890s, exercising the 
franchise was a communally observed, public act. Visually distinct ballots printed and distributed by 
political parties told onlookers what ticket a voter had deposited.43 Openly voting a straight ticket was 
customary, though some electors created bobtail tickets by tearing names off the ballot, or vestpocket 
votes by hiding their tickets all the way up to the ballot box.44 For the most part, voting the ticket was a 
semi-public display of party affiliation frequently met with offers of solidarity in the coin of jobs or 
friendships.45 These gestures grounded open communication before peers in networks of public opinion 
that allowed individuals to communicate particularistic contributions to the constitution of the body 
politic.  
 Public balloting was accompanied by rituals of reciprocity in which electors received direct signs 
that individual participation mattered. Though charges of “vote buying” were freely tossed around in 
the nineteenth century, the exact meaning of this term remains in dispute. Small monetary payments 
and in-kind treating were common on election days.46 In some towns, “floaters” did sell their votes to 
the highest bidder. More often, cash and in-kind transactions such as drink buying were festive public 
rewards for party work and loyalty.47 Reciprocity was sometimes supplemented by coercion. On Election 
Day, party emissaries cajoled, browbeat, and transported electors to the polls.48 Such demonstrations 
rendered visibly concrete each elector’s connection to the popular democratic body and made it hard to 
doubt the significance of voting.  
 Some historians have questioned the depth and breadth of popular commitment behind such 
lavish campaign activity. Altschuler and Blumin suggest that presidential elections were high points in a 
political culture that faded from view in off-year elections, and that nineteenth-century Americans were 
emotionally disengaged from public life.49 In this light, rallies and parades appear less as spontaneous 
expression than party artifice, and as spectacles of entertainment more than engaged politics. They 
argue that candidates were designated less by popular choice than by political insiders who engineered 
electoral outcomes with vote-buying strategies and get-out the-vote schemes. Finally, they suggest that 
politics was widely regarded with cynicism and doubt.  
 These observations can be read differently by focusing on how rituals work. That popular politics 
had periods of low intensity, with off-year elections generating less hoopla and people quickly resuming 
normal lives after Election Day,50 suggests that presidential elections took place within a ritually distinct 
interval able to attract high levels of public interest. It must also be acknowledged that little large-scale 
democratic participation of any kind passes the test of collective spontaneity. Ritual nearly always 
depends on deliberate organizing efforts that count as public evidence for it instead of detracting from 
its value. Finally, claims that nineteenth-century campaigns were entertainment rather than politics 
generate a false dichotomy based on a narrow view of politics as serious business devoted to intellect 
and not sentiment. Popular politics drew in participants from many different realms by finding ways to 
be compelling to all of them. This heterogeneity was a ritual strength, not a shortcoming.  
 Bodily mass communication provided modes of entry into public life for sensibilities unmoved by 
the niceties of political discussion and unencumbered by copious political information. It assembled the 
people for the purpose of reaffirming themselves in all political circumstances. Witnessing, sensing, and 
acting together created a res publica of mutual solidarity among bodies singing, shouting, swaying, or 
marching together, occupying shared space, collectively embracing and repelling other bodies. Such 
activity rendered public opinion concrete and formidable. The body politic was viscerally present and 
passionately apprehended. Shared perceptions, social connections, and massed bodily force constituted 
the essential resources of popular communication and power. As strikes and other forms of labor unrest 
drew on and absorbed popular election experiences, they magnified the concerns of those who 
distrusted popular will and sentiment as base, and more, as hostile to elite interests. 
 
Textualizing Popular Ritual 
For most of the nineteenth century, popular elections featured the visual excess of too many bodies to 
take in at a glance, the aural excess of sounds of war, the tactile excess of male bodies primed with 
alcohol and partisan emotion, and the gustatory excess of roasted animals consumed en masse. Such 
spectacles were the antithesis of bourgeois refinement. They offended elites and middling sorts focused 
on more delicate indoor activities of parlor and study, including discussion, silent reading, intimate 
gatherings of family and friends, and solitary prayer.51 In the 1880s, Newark Republicans bristled at “the 
‘push’ and ‘squeeze’ and sometimes dirty contact of a crowded polling place.”52 They reflected the 
patrician sentiments of those who preferred to distance their bodies from a popular politics they 
regarded as impure.  
 Between the 1880s and World War I, reformers made stringent efforts to purge presidential 
elections of public sensationalism and to suppress bodily mass com munication. By purifying these 
popular aspects of presidential election ritual, they also transformed its meaning. Citizens were less 
likely to enact electoral ritual in democratic masses, more likely to encounter mass mediated texts 
detached from collective contexts. Spectacular, raucous bodily public idioms no longer staked a familiar, 
structured claim on popular politics. Massed bodies, locally rooted and dramatically unpredictable, gave 
way to the newly mobile, singular bodies of presidential candidates, whose remotely mediated images 
were fixed in standardized forms. Dispersed and driven indoors, the democratic mass became less 
visible, audible and real. Eviscerated and textualized, it gradually became the abstract and imagined 
political entity it is today.  
 Textualized voting disenfranchised those bodies most feared by elites and the middling classes. 
In the fifty years after 1860, voter registration laws enforced through new regimes of the written word 
demobilized large numbers of Northern immigrant working classes, Southern blacks and poor whites.53 
Beginning in the late 1880s, seventeen states imposed literacy tests for voting. In the South, Jim Crow 
laws bypassed the Fifteenth Amendment’s (1870) enfranchisement of African Americans.54 Between 
1900 and 1926, eleven states repealed laws enfranchising aliens who publicly swore their intentions to 
become citizens. By 1928, no alien in any state had the right to vote for a candidate for any office for the 
first time in a century.55 Bodily oaths were invalidated, and immigrants were required to bring 
citizenship papers to the polls. Nine Northern states instituted literacy tests before 1920.56 Echoing the 
views of many Progressive era reformers, the Newark Evening News wrote in 1900 that “the man who 
can neither read nor write demonstrates a lack of intelligence or ambition that should disqualify him 
from exercising the highest prerogative of American citizenship.”57  
 As legislative reforms swept the country in the late 1880s, the ballot was also purified. Thirty-
eight states passed new ballot laws between 1888 and 1892.58 Many of them mandated uniform ballots 
printed on standard paper on which only the names of duly certified candidates could appear. Ballots 
often had to be authoritatively stamped and distributed by “sworn public officials,” not “paid political 
workers,” as the New York Ballot Reform League framed the alternatives.59 Buffer zones were drawn 
around polling places to exclude onlookers, and voters were required by law to shield their ballots from 
public gaze.60 Private literate effort replaced public performance and display as voting became a matter 
of decoding lists of printed names and properly marking ballots.  
 Secret balloting significantly changed the meaning of voting. The franchise had been a public act 
of political affiliation undertaken in the presence of others who were spectators, judges, allies, and 
interlocutors in the constitution of a local public opinion that could not be ignored or denied. Secret 
balloting silenced this communicative dimension. Voting no longer “obviously” constituted or reflected 
local bonds. The significance of one anonymous, socially ungrounded vote for president, among millions, 
now seemed far from obvious. Any single vote seemed only to ratify distant state power. Exchanges of 
money had likewise recognized social and political debts incurred. In the reform era, states strove to 
keep any money from changing hands. In 1906, the State of New Jersey hired detectives to police “vote 
buying” and enforced anti-liquor laws with new vigor.61  
 Reformers were also bent on purging many of the sights and sounds that had communicated the 
distinctiveness of Election Day. Bonfires were classified as safety hazards. Election-night fireworks, 
horns, and sirens were banned as public nuisances.62 Previously rowdy city wards were now “devoid of 
any of the real old time excitement,” the Atlantic City Evening Union wrote.63 Observers called elections 
“listless,” “dull,” and “exceedingly quiet,” and remarked on the “astonishing lethargy” of the 
population.64 Without tangible signs that their votes mattered or obvious sensations to tell them this 
day was different, citizens fell back on abstract notions of doing their civic duty. Unsurprisingly, voter 
turnout dropped: nationally, from a 77 percent average between 1876 and 1900, to 65 percent from 
1900 to 1920, and 52 percent from 1920 to 1928; in the North, from over 82 percent to 75 percent and 
58 percent for the same periods.65  
 What was true of Election Day was true of the whole campaign. The spectacular popular 
campaign was fast receding into memory by the first decade of the twentieth century.66 In the 
countryside, all-day rallies with parades and speeches declined after 1900. Urban communities followed 
suit. Torchlight parades and daytime processions were all but gone by 1908. Loyal partisans no longer 
illuminated homes or businesses. Parties seldom hired brass bands or assembled glee clubs. Election 
bets with public payoffs, once common, became an oddity. The campaign clubs that formed the 
backbone of organized popular politics dwindled after the 1890s. Uniformed marching companies were 
virtually extinct by 1912. The Newark Star wrote in 1908, “The political value of these demonstrations 
have [sic] been seriously questioned by campaign managers who pointed to their excessive cost and 
argued that the money expended could be put to better uses—notably, printed matter, mailings, and 
advertising.67 In effect, the parties redirected money and energy from the popular mass to elite-
controlled mass communication.  
 Popular bodies deferred to two kinds of textual elites. One championed a purified, disembodied 
politics of individual conscience and dispassionate principle disembedded from partisan spectacles filled 
with rich emotion and sensory excess. It favored informational texts to educate and discipline the 
masses. A second elite deployed new textual technologies of advertising and public relations to compete 
with public sensationalism by packaging presidential campaigns with pithy slogans and mechanically 
reproduced likenesses. Presidential campaigning gradually shifted from multiple encounters among 
ordinary citizens to remote visions of the elevated singular bodies of candidates. Regular, raucous 
political participation retreated to indoor, intimate, and private social space. Elites contrasted the 
orderly literate habits of an abstract public to the muscular unpredictability of the crowd. Deliberative 
public opinion, a new entity, was celebrated as a benefit to all. In actuality, such equality was more 
abstract than real, since deliberative resources found their greatest purchase among the educated. 
Through secret balloting and new restrictions on electoral eligibility, literate elites stripped political 
agency from assembled, socially linked popular bodies. The bodily ground of election ritual shifted from 
congregational masses rooted in concrete community relationships to the singular, abstractly social 
bodies of newly mobile presidential candidates.  
 Two new political styles emerged: educational and advertised politics.68 One modeled 
middlebrow education; the other, advertising and public relations. Both deployed literate modes in 
which popular bodily idioms found little place. Both favored textual distribution to distant audiences 
over locally performed and evaluated bodily gestures. Following the Civil War, elite reformers pursued 
the educational style in national campaigns of the printed word.69 Mugwumps early yoked the ideal of 
informed citizenship to anti-partisan independent-mindedness, but both major parties adopted this 
notion with a vengeance by 1892. Beginning in the 1870s, party “information bureaus” printed millions 
of documents on tariffs, free silver, and other issues. Educational campaigns sought “less noise and 
more solid work.” They aimed “to supply voters with the ‘right kind’ of literature.”70 Printed party 
platforms likewise increased in length and detail. No more than a page and a half in the 1880s, by the 
1910s they routinely ran four to eight pages. Addressed to solitary readers, their arena was private and 
domestic; their tone was earnest, favoring sobriety and conscience over sensationalism. “This is not a 
campaign of noise and dazzle,” observed the Cleveland Plain Dealer of the 1892 race, “but of reading, of 
thinking and of work.”71 Printed platforms seemed to make bodily mass communication unnecessary. 
Where information came directly from the national organization, there was little need to work out 
political views in concert with others, a socially unpredictable process beyond the supervision of elites 
and potentially threatening to them.  
 Changes in journalism went hand in hand with educational politics. Though media had always 
been part of political campaigns, the relative balance between bodies and texts now shifted 
disproportionately towards the latter. Nineteenth-century newspapers had spoken for party 
organizations whose funds often supported them. As urban audiences increased in size, literacy, and 
affluence during the 1870s and 1880s, big-city newspapers cultivated new readers and constructed new 
relationships to them. Editors trumpeted a new kind of journalism that served the public good by 
remaining independent of party. Reporters, increasingly “educated men,” sounded the virtues of 
deliberative politics and “accurate, factual” news, replacing partisan drama and loyalty with impartial, 
distanced views of the facts. Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst wooed the jilted popular body 
for a new kind of urban mass press that appealed to sensory experience with lavish illustrations, banner 
headlines, color printing, stunts and crusades, and lurid stories of crime and sex.  
 Both the independent and mass press stigmatized partisan subjectivity. The independent press 
championed professional textual expertise as a reflection of lofty, high-minded devotion to education 
and independence from political partisanship. Though it avoided explicit class appeals, this vision was in 
truth class-specific, offering a self-absorbed and narrowed politics that most appealed to middle and 
upper classes. The mass press engaged political stories as gossip rather than public affairs, and derided a 
politics of ideas in favor of a politics of personalities and private lives. Journalism thus colluded in a 
textually driven split between thought and feeling, associating good politics with dry civic pedagogy, and 
feeling and emotion with low prejudice. If the independent press made politics too complicated for 
working class readers, the mass press trivialized it. Forced to compete with independent and sensational 
styles, the party press abandoned its traditional role of creating a politically comprehensible world for 
readers in partisan terms while shifting its economic base from partisan expressions of political 
preferences to advertising.  
 Advertised politics was the second textualized mode deployed in presidential campaigning.72 
Where educational politics emphasized policy and principle, advertised politics presented presidential 
candidates as personalities. Advertised politics circulated pithy fragments of discourse as “advance 
copy,” rendering actual bodily utterance nearly superfluous. Whereas educational politics relied on 
traditional technologies of plate matter and pamphlets and elite rules of discourse, advertised politics 
seized on representational modes associated with emerging technologies of mass communication. Its 
tools were advertising, public relations, mass-circulation daily newspapers, half-tone engravings, motion 
pictures, and later, radio and television. All these created the candidate as a textualized presence 
detached from local and community relations of the sort dramatized and enacted in spectacular partisan 
display. Though not fully deployed until the 1916 campaign, the advertised style had germinated for two 
decades in the parties’ new national “publicity bureaus” where the inventors of modern public relations, 
Ivy Lee, George F. Parker, and George Creel, had all apprenticed. Its practitioners angled strategically for 
coverage by purchasing full-page ads from independent-minded print media in steady retreat from 
traditional partisan loyalties. They helped direct money toward textual and advertising elites and away 
from ordinary voters and body-based partisan spectacle.  
 Candidate bodies moved definitively into the public arena during the bitterly fought 1896 
campaign in which both presidential contenders actively campaigned for the first time. In the semi-
public space of his Ohio front yard, William McKinley displayed himself almost daily to journalists and 
supporters. William Jennings Bryan traveled to twenty-nine states in a strategy calculated to capture 
coverage in newspapers, most of which were editorially opposed to Democrats.73 Popular bodies 
receded from view in presidential campaigns to be replaced by proliferating images of the bodies of 
candidates. These were readily abstracted into newspaper and campaign texts that aimed at dispersed 
national audiences and bypassed particularistic local webs of class and social relations. Along with 
stickers and posters inscribed with trademark slogans like “Full Dinner Pail” and “Poverty or Prosperity,” 
Republicans distributed millions of mechanically reproduced images of McKinley. Theodore Roosevelt 
famously observed that Republican chairman Mark Hanna had “advertised McKinley as if he were a 
patent medicine!”74  
 While street protests by suffragists in the 1910s demonstrated the ongoing power of amassed 
bodies to press for democratic reforms, the popular body was no longer a regular player in American 
political life by the time women gained the vote in 1920.75 Ballot reform and textualized campaigns of 
education and advertising had helped engineer the end of the democratic crowd as the bodily ground of 
election ritual. As locally produced campaign spectacles withered, and Election Day revelry died down, 
campaign crowds gathered mostly when presidential candidates came to town. Where outdoor 
assemblies once had given form to the rhythms and relations of local political life, distant party elites 
supervised the schedules of whistle-stop gatherings that displayed little interest in homegrown 
traditions.  
 As popular bodies migrated to alternative rites of sport, religion, and mass entertainments, 
collective attention shifted from political and labor spheres to consumption, games, and spirituality. By 
the 1890s, professional baseball and college football gathered large crowds in less open, less 
perambulatory spaces that were increasingly yoked to commercialism. Dwight Moody and Billy Sunday 
updated an American tradition of mass religious revivals, in which shouting, swaying bodies were 
restrained by Protestant morals, and bourgeois manners disciplined the rougher side of the electoral 
congregation. New amusement parks furnished new, mechanically manufactured bodily sensations and 
electrified some of the nocturnal excitement and social fertility of torchlight electoral parades. Civic 
sympathies sounded a minor chord in these commercially pitched spectacles of bodily mass 
communication. 
 With the eclipse of body-based electoral communication, US citizens had lost a unique way of 
experiencing themselves as publicly assembled congregations engaged in civic rituals of consequence. 
As the electoral crowd waned, so did its political power. Gone were recurring exhibitions of muscular 
force in the disciplined, latent violence of the march and the unrestrained violence of the mob. Bodily 
mass communication had been a powerful magnet for people of less refined tastes and less discursive 
dispositions. This was especially true of the young and working classes, two groups dramatically 
disengaged from contemporary elections. As the drama and pageantry of voting were textualized, the 
thinner sensationalism of the mediated word supplanted live electoral sensations. Public opinion was no 
longer felt and experienced concretely, but simulated in aggregated votes and statistically drawn polls. 
In an earlier era, the congregational crowd had informed itself of the collective and individual 
importance of its members. In spite of being socially partial in their constitution, the popular electoral 
rituals of that era compare favorably in inclusiveness and democratic procedure to contemporary rituals 
in which candidates and elite commentators occupy the symbolic center; wealthy, textually certified 
elites pull the strings, and the public is concealed and dispersed in private and semi-private indoor 
spaces. 
 Conspicuous investments of local energy and treasure in nineteenth-century electoral contests 
displayed and strengthened the alluvial, recursive sociability of community life. Criss-crossing social and 
political bonds created sturdy networks through which local power flowed. Texts as a contemporary 
political mode, by contrast, are largely indifferent to surplus social value created by bodily mass 
communication, the better to flow unimpeded through channels directed at those whose sole value to 
political elites is the mobilizeability of their votes. Throughout the twentieth century, dispersed 
communities became increasingly tethered to a national center by centralized political communication, 
civic education, and mass media. These textual forms were able to bypass, and thus helped to atrophy, 
the political and social links binding local citizens to one another. Streamlined political communication 
also narrowed the messages that passed between ordinary citizens and political elites on terms specified 
by the latter. The socially thinnest dimension of voting, mere number, projected a politics divorced from 
bodies. Deprived of that power, they offered no barrier to centralizing national elites and withered as a 
political force. 
 
The 2000 Presidential Election: Voting Alone 
The popular body was a significant, though unacknowledged, player in the most famous controversy in 
recent US presidential election history, the 2000 race between George W. Bush and Al Gore. A perilous 
moment of that contest came when a menacing mob of partisans intimidated Miami-Dade County 
election commissioners debating a vote recount. During the time the vote was in dispute, street crowds 
asserted themselves across Florida, at the Texas governor’s mansion in Austin and at the vice-
presidential residence in Washington, DC. This unaccustomed embodiment of strong partisan sentiment, 
a throwback to the lively nineteenth-century electoral crowd, was widely deplored as menacing and 
contrived. 
 For a moment, it seemed that bodies might decide the election through hand recounts locally 
negotiated, but that moment passed. The US Supreme Court ruled that bodies must remove themselves 
from proximity to the ballots to prevent further contamination. As it had in the early twentieth century, 
the historical strength of the reforming impulse kept bodies and texts at a purifying distance from one 
another in this most important of national rituals. A review of the disputed counties by the US Civil 
Rights Commission showed that ballots cast by African Americans—the most suspect stratum of bodies 
in the national electoral imagination—were ten times more likely to be rejected by textual rules for valid 
ballots than those cast by white voters.76 Cast in textualized form, tribal exclusivity remained the order 
of the day. 
 Beyond the extraordinary events in Florida, which bodies merely threatened to unravel, the 
national election presented the usual story of textual triumph and bodily disengagement. In an election 
officially too close to call, voter turnout was 51 percent, in line with a long-term decline over the 
twentieth century. Though pundits claimed the lesson of Florida was the sanctity and power of 
individual votes, unguarded remarks occasionally belied these sentiments. In a humorous aside, a New 
York Times columnist betrayed an elite disposition to value individual voters mostly in the abstract: “We 
treasure the idea that any one individual’s ballot could decide an election. But watching the interviews 
with some of the men and women on the street in Florida, you can’t help think, oh, Lord, not that 
one.”77 
 Ordinary voters in the 2000 elections knew they were not consequential players. Handfuls of 
votes rarely determine presidential elections, and Florida was more anomaly than lesson. Modern 
elections mostly range the elite forces of the advertised style of politics against those of the educational 
style, leaving most of the country out of the loop. In the wake of Florida, some reformers championed 
textual remedies to correct ballot irregularities with voting machines designed to minimize bodily 
contact with the ballot. Others proposed to remove the body altogether by standardizing local election 
procedures and automating vote counts entirely. All ignored the continuing disengagement of popular 
bodies from the political process. The passionately engaged popular body so feared by nineteenth-
century political elites thus stands in sharp contrast to the popular body of today. This latter body elicits 
neither fear nor respect, since it is nowhere concretely to be found. Mediated punditry invokes it largely 
in the breach. It is remarked on dismissively, as in the words of the Times columnist above; abstractly, in 
what George W. Bush called “that big swath of red on the map” of televised election returns;78 and now 
and then in reverent genuflection to the deliberative ideal that has put an end to it. 
 In the election of 2000, the candidates’ bodies were as mobile as ever, traveling in an attempt to 
generate political spectacle and popular audiences. Sometimes they were successful; often they were 
not. The alienation of everyday bodies was reflected in this account of the presidential campaign’s final 
week: 
For a moment on Monday morning, Sandra Shipley thought she might head over to Portland 
Community College to see the man she prefers to be the next president of the United States, Vice 
President Al Gore. Don Hagar thought, briefly, of attending an afternoon rally at Memorial 
Coliseum for his man, Gov. George W. Bush. Instead, Ms. Shipley shopped for shoes, and Mr. Hagar 
went for a 10-mile run. “He’s not a very exciting speaker,” Ms. Shipley, 32, a part-time student, 
said of Mr. Gore. “I mean, as a Democrat, I’m voting for him. That should be enough.” Mr. Hagar, 
42, a sales manager for a computer parts company, was hardly more apologetic. “The way they 
promoted the event, I knew they wouldn’t miss me,” he said.79 
These citizens saw their bodies as superfluous to collective gatherings that once lay at the heart of 
campaign ritual. In response, the candidates offered nothing sensational to engage face-to-face 
audiences. These voters expressed their apathy by choosing alternative body-focused activities, 
pampering the body in one case, disciplining it in the other. Both voiced the broad piety that only voting 
is a significant political act. 
 On important occasions when the candidates were brought before the masses, the masses were 
instructed to behave themselves. Normative talk around the nationally televised presidential debates 
presumed an electorate of informed, independent-minded citizens whose bodies could not be trusted to 
remain silent and decorous. A letter to the editor of the New York Times urged the evacuation of 
popular bodies from the deliberative field of rational, unbiased observation. 
Now that the presidential debate format has been settled … there is one detail that is necessary 
for these debates to be fair: the local audience should absolutely not be shown on the air. If it 
were, millions of TV viewers would be distracted and possibly biased by the reactions of that 
audience, at the risk of defeating the entire purpose of these debates: to give the country the 
opportunity to view and evaluate the candidates being themselves, pure and simple.80  
Popular bodies threatened to attach the presidential candidates to “local” audiences of supporters and 
detractors instead of allowing them to stand, godly, alone. 
 The elite journalist selected to moderate three nationally televised debates forbade crowd 
participation at the first of them and clamped strict limits on partisan enthusiasm: 
There’s a small audience in the hall tonight. They are not here to participate, only to listen. I have 
asked and they have agreed to remain silent for the next 90 minutes except for right now when 
they will applaud as we welcome the two candidates.81 
Except as silent spectators, popular bodies were banished from the debates. The small and grudging 
exhibition of feeling allowed them was closely monitored. They were still more forcefully admonished 
before the second debate: 
The audience participants … shall not ask follow-up questions or otherwise participate in the 
extended discussion. And the questioner’s microphone will be turned off after he or she completes 
asking the question.82 
Thus were onlookers barred from affective displays and permitted only the most truncated participation 
in the much-touted rational discussion of the issues. 
 When, on another occasion, a broadcast network organized focus groups meant to provide 
deliberative civic simulacra for viewers, participants were unsure how to act. These citizen 
“undecideds,” unaccustomed to having their bodies publicly included in the campaign, fell back on the 
ritual props of the cerebral voter: 
The participants, jittery at first, clutched pens and pads and took pages and pages of notes during 
the debate. As the cameras prepared to beam them to the nation, they fell utterly silent.83 
There were faint echoes of the lost customs of nineteenth-century politics. Before their public 
performance, the participants “munched on a buffet dinner of chicken and meatballs” and got their 
“marching orders” from a CNN executive. For this well-fed statistical sample, “marching” meant sitting 
still for turn-taking parlor conversation among others with whom they shared mainly a lack of conviction 
about the candidates. By such means, tentative, engineered talk has supplanted mass bodily noise as 
the characteristic sound of modern elections. The embodied electoral crowd has largely ceased to be 
visible to itself or anyone else. Cut off from itself as the body politic, it has become the logical product of 
the modern election process— the socially detached, apathetic class of “undecideds.” Unanchored in a 
materially obvious political life, it is sporadic, uninterested, and free-floating. 
 Meanwhile, the textual armies of advertised politics grew richer from political business. An 
expert array of journalists, pollsters, media buyers, telemarketers, ad agencies, and political consultants 
deployed arsenals of computer databases, direct mail, websites, and media outlets to assault 
demographic clusters reconstructed as a “public” in numerical form. If money is the symbolic marker of 
who counts, the flow of cash to media and consulting organizations announced the lopsided victory of 
textual elites over the electorate. Candidates spent more than one billion dollars on political advertising, 
little of which found its way to ordinary citizens. No campaign finance reform proposal suggested free 
drinks or token payments for voters who took the trouble to trek to the polls to perform an abstract 
civic duty. 
 In conclusion, it may be said that modern presidential politics is a struggle among textual elites 
for control of a central political ritual in which popular bodies find little purchase. Neither advertised 
politics nor high-minded deliberation offers much celebration, broad-based invitation, or fun. Neither is 
fertile or spacious enough to constitute a broadly popular political life. This is regrettable, since elections 
are about more than choosing a mass-circulated presidential personality or piously discussing issues. 
They are also rites of solidarity in which participants may revel in popular power for its own sake. 
Progressive Era purification and textualization of campaign rituals commenced a long era of bodily 
disengagement from presidential elections in the US. Though reformers hoped to banish congregational 
crowds that did not share their more refined civic sensibilities, the bodily mass communication and 
public sensationalism they purged remain unique forms of political communication whose social bonds 
and collective messages are duplicated by no other means than live assembly. 
 It remains to ask what lessons can be drawn from this legacy of distrust for the forms of political 
expression and challenge that congregational crowds offer. Faced with continuing civic disengagement 
in the US, a number of voices have begun to argue for the democratic value of a physically celebratory 
politics.84 Does this mean that people should vote ignorant, drunk, and disorderly? What should be the 
role of political crowds in the twenty-first century? Are bullyboys ever a legitimate expression of political 
partisanship? 
 Though nineteenth-century election rituals were not uniformly inclusive and tolerated abuses 
that would no longer be acceptable, they remain democratically instructive. Live public sensations 
created broad points of entry into civic life, socialized the young, and appealed to less refined political 
dispositions. They suffused common space with uncommon sensations jointly shared. Popular social 
movements have drawn upon these aspects of crowd-based ritual ever since, often with powerful 
results. But crowds always remain unpredictable, and their potential for disturbance remains. It should, 
since the mere textualization of civic life is no guarantee of democracy. While crowds may be anti-
democratic on some occasions, on others they may be all the democracy there is. 
 The line that congregational crowds ought to toe is not a theoretical but a historical question to 
be worked out in the press of political give and take. Bodily mass communication and public 
sensationalism have their democratic uses, even in excessive and impolite forms. History shows clearly 
that not only bodily groups move in herds. It is sometimes forgotten that in Germany in 1932, not just 
partisan intimidation but voting was part of the strategy by which Hitler’s regime established itself. 
Observers have not, as a result, concluded that voting is too risky for the democratic process. 
Deliberative reasoning is not without its herd aspects, and the genteelly literate may be less 
discriminating than they seem. Critical consciousness is nurtured not only in literate communication or 
turn-taking discussion but also in collective bodily experience. We need involved and informed voters 
alike. These will rarely, and need not, be equally developed aspects in every elector. Rooting for the 
home team with all the romance and drama of the ballfield leads fans to be interested not only in 
baseball scores and histories, but also in team strategies, strengths, and weaknesses. We should trust 
political spectacle that much. 
 Congregational crowds contribute to a richer, more vital and responsive civic life. They are 
arenas of social fertility and political action. They create shared feelings of legitimacy in nations that call 
themselves democracies and count themselves as ideologically committed to the “people.” Democratic 
publics can take stock of themselves only by gathering indiscriminately together. This is what electoral 
crowds offer. In the ritual proximity of popular assembly, citizens may combine in politically new and 
creative ways, encounter those with whom they share the world, and animate their aspirations with the 
force of live congregational experience. 
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